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CLD-232        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






OMAR S. FOLK, 




BUREAU OF PRISONS, Employees and Medical Staff; PA-C Samuel GOSA; 
ELIZABETH SANTOS/STAHL, Clinical Director; DR. ROBERT E. PUCELL; JOHN 
T. BURN; BRIAN BUSCHMAN; D. PARKER; M. MAGYAR; R. PARKYN; 
C. SMITH; JENNIFER HOLTZ-APPLE; DAVID J. BALL; PA-C ZALNO; CO. 
GENTZYEL; R&D FAUSEY; M. WASHINGTON; L. HUNTER; J. POTOPE; 
T. GREELY; T. ANDRESS; T. CULLEN; J. MARIS; A. RODERMEL; A. DEWALT; 
C. CRAIG; NICK MAIZE; C. ERICKSON; E. STAHL; J. WALKER; C. CAIN; 
J. FREYNIK; D. NICOLLETTE; T. THOMAS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 3:18-cv-02252) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 29, 2021 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 















 Omar Sierre Folk appeals from orders of the District Court dismissing his claims 
and ruling on several motions.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In 2018, Folk initiated an action in the District Court, bringing civil rights claims 
relating to his medical care in prison.  Folk subsequently amended his complaint, and 
several defendants moved to dismiss it.  The District Court granted their motion without 
prejudice and with leave to further amend. 
In doing so, the District Court directed Folk to comply with Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8 and 20 when filing a second amended complaint.  The District Court 
explained that Folk’s 14-page amended complaint primarily set out summaries of isolated 
and unrelated events, spanning five years, and named 16 defendants.  It instructed him 
about the requirements of Rules 8 and 20, noting that he should identify his related claims 
against each defendant individually, along with the facts supporting those claims.  The 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





District Court explained that if Folk wished to bring claims about separate, unrelated 
incidents, he should file separate complaints initiating additional actions to address those 
unrelated incidents.  The District Court also warned that this would be Folk’s final 
opportunity to amend his complaint to comply with Rules 8 and 20. 
 Rather than clarify his claims, Folk responded by filing a 247-page second 
amended complaint against 51 defendants.  This document is a largely handwritten 
account of Folk’s interactions with various prison staff and medical providers between 
2013 and 2020.  In portions of the complaint, Folk alleged that Dr. David J. Ball, a 
private physician, failed to adequately treat knee and thigh injuries from 2013 to 2018.  
Folk stated that Dr. Ball ordered several MRIs and x-rays of Folk’s leg and ordered nerve 
testing and a new knee brace for him.  Dr. Ball also recommended injections to treat 
Folk’s pain, but Folk declined them.  Folk claimed that Dr. Ball refused to perform 
surgery on his ruptured quadricep because he feared that Folk may have permanent nerve 
damage and recommended physical therapy and exercise as an alternative treatment. 
 Dr. Ball filed a motion to dismiss, as did a group of defendants employed by the 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”); the remaining defendants Folk named in his second amended 
complaint had not yet been served.  In the meantime, Folk moved for: (1) reconsideration 
of an earlier order denying his request for intervention from the District Court regarding 
his legal mail; (2) an entry of default against certain defendants; and (3) appointment of 




failure to comply with a local rule and denied the others.  The District Court subsequently 
granted Dr. Ball’s motion to dismiss Folk’s claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  It also dismissed the remainder of Folk’s complaint pursuant 
to Rules 8 and 20.  The District Court did so by granting the BOP defendants’ motion and 
dismissing, sua sponte, Folk’s remaining claims against several dozen unserved 
defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Folk timely appealed, specifying that he sought to appeal the dismissal of his 
claims and the District Court’s rulings on his other motions.  On appeal, he has filed a 
motion to vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  While we 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6), 
see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009), we review a dismissal 
for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion, see In re 
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996).  Dismissal for failure to state 
a claim is appropriate “if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true 
and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] 
plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 
77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  We construe Folk’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. 




“on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question, 
see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Folk’s claims.  For his claims 
against Dr. Ball, the District Court correctly concluded that Folk failed to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  Although it was not entirely clear, it appeared that Folk sought to 
bring claims of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and professional negligence 
under state law.  “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).  
Establishing a claim requires proving both an objective component — “a serious medical 
need” — and a subjective component — “acts or omissions by prison officials that 
indicate deliberate indifference to that need.”  See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 
318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Folk alleged that Dr. Ball conducted testing, ordered an assistive device, and 
offered injections for pain that Folk declined.  He also claimed that Dr. Ball would not 
perform surgery on an injury because he feared that Folk would have permanent nerve 
damage, offering alternative treatment in the form of physical therapy and exercise.  
These allegations show that Folk merely disagreed with the course of treatment 




constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.  See Monmouth Cnty. 
Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. Cir. 1987); see also U.S. ex rel. 
Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (“Where a 
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the 
treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and 
to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”) (citation omitted). 
Further, the District Court properly dismissed Folk’s claim of professional 
negligence against Dr. Ball.  Folk did not file a certificate of merit (“COM”) or claim that 
a COM was unnecessary, as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3, 
despite receiving ample notice about the requirement in Dr. Ball’s motion to dismiss.  See 
Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Pennsylvania’s notice 
requirement, like the COM requirement itself, is substantive state law under [Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)].”); Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 
F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.6-7.  Accordingly, Folk’s 
claims against Dr. Ball were properly dismissed. 
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
the remainder of Folk’s claims under Rule 8.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 
requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 
jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 




and direct.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).  “Taken together,” Rules 8(a) and 8(d)(1) 
“underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.”  
Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 702 (citation omitted).  A statement must be plain “to give the 
adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare 
for trial,” and must be short to avoid placing “an unjustified burden on the court and the 
part[ies] who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material 
from a mass of verbiage.”  Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
Folk’s second amended complaint was anything but “simple, concise, and direct.”  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).  Rather than clarifying his 14-page amended complaint, 
Folk’s 247-page second amended complaint, which spans seven years of encounters with 
dozens of people, is dense, very difficult to follow, and lacking any consistent structure.  
It is so voluminous and unfocused that it is largely impossible to identify what about 
Folk’s encounters with most prison and medical staff could support any claim for relief or 
what those claims were for each of the 51 defendants. 
As was the case here, “a district court acts within its discretion when it dismisses 
an excessively prolix and overlong complaint,” especially after the litigant has been given 




69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020).1  The District Court 
“expressly warned [Folk] that failure to replead [his] claims in compliance with Rule 8 
would result in the dismissal of those claims” and explained how to comply with that 
rule.  See Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 704.  Where Folk responded by filing an extremely 
lengthy document that was significantly harder to understand, dismissal of his complaint 
under Rule 8 was appropriate.2  See id. at 703 (affirming the dismissal of an 
“unnecessarily complicated and verbose” 240-page counseled complaint that plaintiffs 
had failed to sufficiently narrow through “two rounds of difficult motions”); see also 
Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that it is not a 
“district court’s job to stitch together cognizable claims for relief from [a] wholly 
deficient pleading”).  Under these circumstances, the District Court also did not err in 
 
1  In light of this conclusion, we need not consider the District Court’s additional 
conclusion that Folk’s second amended complaint violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, which is 
not an independent basis to dismiss a complaint.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.  We note, 
however, that the District Court’s Rule 20 analysis further underscores the deficiencies of 
Folk’s second amended complaint under Rule 8.  The manner in which Folk included so 
many claims against so many defendants makes it exceedingly difficult to determine 
where one claim ends and another begins and which specific claims relate to which 
specific defendants.  In that regard, we note that the fact that Dr. Ball was able to identify 
and respond to claims against him does not mean that the same was true for the other 
defendants.  Cf. Garrett, 938 F.3d at 96 n.29 (addressing the application of Rule 8 to 
“specific defendants”). 
2  For the same reasons, the District Court did not err in dismissing Folk’s claims against 
the unserved defendants sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to comply 
with Rule 8.  See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that a 
district court may dismiss claims sua sponte for failure to comply with Rule 8 where a 
“complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true 




denying Folk further leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
We further conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Folk’s other 
motions.  We discern no error in the District Court’s decision to deem Folk’s motion for 
reconsideration of an earlier order regarding his legal mail to be withdrawn under M.D. 
Pa. Local Rule 7.5 after he did not timely file a brief in support of the motion.  See 
United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2000).  The District Court 
also did not abuse its discretion in denying, without prejudice, Folk’s request for an entry 
of default against defendants who had not yet been served.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); 
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).  Finally, although it is 
unfortunate that Folk appears unable to articulate the claims he may believe he has, we 
have no basis to conclude that any such claims might be potentially valid and thus cannot 
say that the District Court abused its discretion by denying Folk’s request for 
appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 






3  Folk’s motion to vacate and remand is denied. 
